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Human Life Begins: 
Integrated Senate Report 
Rev. Theodore Hall, O.P., S.T.D. 
Father Hall is an associate pro-
fessor of theology and a special 
lec turer in philosophy at Provi-
dence College. Long a tenured 
faculty member there, he taught 
at various other colleges, both 
before and after obtaining his 
doctorate from Rome. 
Introduction 
Notwithstanding overly dramatized presentation by TV and other 
media to keep alive the question about the precise time when each 
human life begins, the so-called controversy has ended. Actually, "the 
scientific consensus on the biological fact of the beginning of each 
human life has existed ever since the medical and scientific communi-
ties became aware of the progress of conception in the mid-nineteenth 
century." This affirmation, based upon exhaustive evidence from 
professional testimony, was made available to the public in January, 
1982, following a subcommittee's report to the U.S. Senate on the 
Human Life Bill, S 158. 1 
Upon studying this " report," it becomes clear that the evidence 
presented from the physical sciences (which, accurately or 
inaccurately, are often called empirical or experimental) ought to be 
integrated with the same teachings set forth by sound philosophy, 
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because there is little doubt that these sciences, each within the limita-
tions of its own objectives, have sooner or later arrived at the same 
valid conclusions. 
Basic Facts of Report 
It is of no small interest that, of the 57 witnesses who testified, 
including world-renowned geneticists, biologists, and practicing physi-
cians, 11 testified in support of the bill (HLB-SI58) and 11 were in 
opposition to it. Nevertheless, their judgment on the bill had nothing 
to do with the precise element of when life begins. " The testimony of 
these witnesses and the voluminous submissions received by the sub-
committee demonstrate that contemporary scientific evidence points 
to a clear conclusion: the life of a human being begins at conception; 
the time when the process of fertilization is complete." 2 
Among the testimonies, one can recognize an ever-increasing impor-
tance both with regard to the authority of the witnesses and the 
contents verified. 
For example, Dr. Jerome Lejeune of the Universite Rene Descartes 
in Paris, discoverer of the chromosomal disease which causes 
mongolism, testified that "(l)ife has a very, very long history, but each 
J 
individual has a very neat beginning - the moment of its conception I 
(hearings on S158, April 23 transcript, p. 18) .3 ~ 
"Similarly, Dr. Watson Bowes, Professor of Obstetrics and Gyneco l- ( 
ogy at the University of Colorado School of Medicine, stated, 'If we I 
are talking, then, about the biological beginning of a human life or \ 
lives, as distinct from other human lives, the answer is most assuredly 
that it is at the time of conception - that is to say, the time at which 
a human ovum is fertilized by a human sperm (p. 61) .... This 
straightforward biological fact should not be distorted to serve socio-
logical, political, or economic goals' (p. 65). 4 
"Dr. Hymie Gordon, Professor of Medical Genetics and physician at 
th e Mayo Clinic, affirmed this consensus and recognized the 
distinction between the scientific question and the value question: 'I 
think we can now also say that the question of the beginning of 
life - when life begins - is no longer a question for theological or 
philosophical dispute. It is an established scientific fact. Theologians 
and philosophers may go on to debate the meaning of life or the 
purpose of life, but it is an established fact that all life, including 
human life, begins at the moment of conception' (pp. 31,32). 
"Dr. Gordon further observed: ' I have never ever seen in my own 
scientific reading, long before I became concerned with issues of life 
of this nature, that anyone has ever argued that life did not begin at 
) 
the moment of conception and that it was a human conception if it \ ' 
resulted from the fertilization of the human egg by a human sperm. As 
far as I know , these have never been argued against' " (p. 52).5 
254 Linacre Quarterly 
J 
Especially valuable is the following formulation of the material 
under consideration. " Dr. Micheline Matthew-Roth, a principal 
research associate in the Department of Medicine at the Harvard Medi-
cal School, after·.reviewing the scientific literature on the question of 
when the life of a human being begins, concluded her statement with 
these words: 'So, therefore, it is scientifically correct to say that an 
individual human life begins at conception, when egg and sperm join 
to form the zygote, and that this developing human always is a 
member of our species in all stages of its life' " (pp. 41, 42).6 
This formulation emphasizes the important points that 1) not only 
is there life from the first moment of fertilization (conception) but, 
2) it is a human life, 3) belonging to an individual, 4) a member of the 
species man (homo sapiens), 5) who must be classified as human from 
fertilization and throughout all its stages of life. And it was with this 
understanding, and an even deeper one, as will become evident, that 
the Report presented its convictions to the Senate in a step-by-step 
procedure matching the teachings of the philosophical sciences. 
Integrating Philosophy with the Report 
Through the ages, at least scholastic philosophy has rigorously 
maintained its notions of the above enunciated terms, such as living 
(life), human nature, species, individual, essence (same through all its 
stages of life) . The reason for this is that the core of the problem as to 
when an individual human life begins rests beyond everything else 
upon the certitude of what essentially constitu tes the nature of man, 
thereby distinguishing a human being as such from any other species 
of animal. 
1) "Life" begins at fertilization: 
The term " living" is adequately studied in the " philosophy of 
nature" where the living, having been set apart from the nonliving, is 
said to be alive, not because of the body but because of the life-giving 
principle within the body. This life-giving principle in any organic 
body is called the soul. Even historically, the human embryo in its 
earliest stages was said to be alive and, therefore, to have q soul. But, 
in those early days, since embryos were difficu~t to obt~in', ' ~ll1d even 
more difficult to examine minutely, since man posse'ssect ' only crude 
scientific instruments, the soul probably was thought to be only 
vegetative, initially. This opinion that the human embryo first 
possessed a vegetative soul, then a sensitive soul, then a human soul 
(three soul theory), held by Aquinas on the authority of Aristotle's 
teaching on matter and form, had to yield before the greater certainty 
of modern embryology. 7 
Modern embryology has uncovered human characteristics in the 
embryo as early as three weeks postovulation. Such characteristics 
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include heartbeat, arm and leg buds, shoulder segments, spinal column 
nerves, etc. 8 These developing characteristics may not possess the 
ultimate perfections of a fully developed human body, but they are 
identifiable as different from every other species of animal. Hence, the 
science of embryology does.not hesitate to classify these facts under a 
study of the "human" embryo. Neither does the Senate Report hesi-
tate to conclude this section of the testimonies with the formulation 
which states: " individual human life begins at conception ... . that 
this developing human always is a member of our species in all stages 
of life." 9 
A brief but necessary digression must be made here because of 
unreliable and misleading publications relative to the "three soul 
theory" and abortion. One pUblication states: " But St. Thomas 
Aquinas thought that the soul was not infused until the embryo was 
formed. He wrote that no human being exists during the ear ly period 
of gestation and only when the fetus had attained human shape and 
human organs could it have a human soul. He believed therefore that 
abortion during the early period should be permitted." 10 
We ourselves verified by way of locus the first part of this statement 
that Aquinas opted for Aristotle's idea of the three soul t heory. We 
might also note that Aquinas's principle, that the human soul is 
present when the embryo (fetus for him) has attained human shape 
and human organs, has been upheld by modern embryology. At least 
modern embryology and the Report have said such an embryo is 
"human." 
We find it quite unrealistic, however, for authors to draw t he con· 
clusion that Aquinas therefore permitted abortion in the early period 
of gestation. It would have been most convenient had the authors 
referred to the locus of St. Thomas's teaching. Likewise, this rendition 
of his teaching must hardly be of recent vintage since, as Austin 
Fagothey, S.J. also notes: "Aristotle (On the Generation of Animals, 
bk. II, ch. 3) thought that the embryo does not becom e human until 
some time after conception, and this may be why he saw no wrong in 
early abortion. St. Thomas ( Summa Th eologica, I, q. 118, a. 2 reply 
to obj. 2; Summa Contra Gentiles, bk. II, ch. 89) accepted Aristotle's 
opinion as a probablr. physical theory but drew no such ethical con-
clusion." 11 
Anyone familiar with Thomistic principles would hardly hold that, 
under the supposition that the early embryo or fetus did not have a 
human soul, it would not be a grave crime against nature to destroy 
what nature intended to become a hum an being. Would anyone who 
planted grass seed be content with a settlement in law which allowed a 
perpetrator who unearthed the seed to be easily dismissed, simply > 
because what was destroyed had not yet, in fulfillment of nature, 
become grass? 
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2) It is a "human being's" life. 
As we return to our original priorities, the Report acknowledged 
that against the broad consensus supporting "human life begins at 
fertilization," there are those who deny knowing when a "human" life 
begins. 12 This apparent- contradiction was resolved by the sub-
committee when it noted that the opposing statements were 
extremely subjective, basing this position upon the "humanness" or 
value attributed to the living organism. "They took the view that each 
person may define as 'human' only those beings whose lives that per-
son wants to value. Because they did not wish to accord intrinsic 
worth to the lives of unborn children, they refused to call them 
'human beings,' regardless of the scientific evidence." 13 Philosoph-
ically, one could hardly find serious fault with the operating definition 
of a "human being" as presented by the subcommittee itself: "The 
customary meaning of 'human being' is an individual being who is 
human, i.e., of the human species." 14 
3) It is an "individual" human being. 
Confusion must also arise at times between the perpetuation of all 
human life and the beginning of an "individual" human life. Definite 
signs of this occur in the clarification given by Dr. Jerome Lejeune (in 
early testimonies) when he says: "(l)ife has a very, very long history, 
but each individual has a very neat beginning - the moment of con-
ception." 
The confusion is especially manifest in the minority views of Sen. 
Max Baucus which, of course, the subcommittee did not accept. "Dr. 
James Ebert, President of the Carnegie Institution, while objecting to 
certain terminology - 'narrow definition of "actual human life," for 
human life cannot properly be said to begin at any single moment 
fixed in time' - objected on the basis that 'human life is a continuum, 
• proceeding generation after generation .... These eggs like the other 
cells of the woman's body are living. The sperm maturing in the 
human male are no less alive. The union of living egg and living sperm 
results in a living zygote, no less alive than its parental predecessors, 
but differing from both of them.' " 15 Implicit in this statement, how-
ever, is that Dr. Ebert must realize that it is a new "individual" upon 
whom we are concentrating. 
A statement even more difficult to understand is this: "Dr. Robert 
Ebert, President of the Milbank Memorial Fund and former Dean of 
Harvard Medical School wrote the Subcommittee as follows: 'I know 
of no " ... current medical and scientific data ... " that supports the 
contention" ... that human life in the sense of an actual human being 
or legal person begins at conception." Life in the biological sense does 
not begin the moment that an ovum is fertilized by a sperm, since 
both have life prior to that event.' " 16 We seriously doubt that either 
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of the above members of the medical profession would expect us to 
conclude that the ovum by itself or the sperm by itself, because each 
is alive, is each a human being. The "scientific consensus" of t he 
subcommittee is expressed more accurately, in the testimonies already 
noted as to where and when a new " ind ividual" human being is said to 
be alive. 
In a very practical way, test tube (in vitro) fertilization is under-
taken because science is aware of when an "individual" human life 
begins, hence, " The biological consensus that conception marks the 
beginning of the life of a human being has recently been confirmed by 
the process of creating a new human life outside the mother, the 'test 
tube baby.' " (See testim ony of Dr. Lejeune, Hearings on S153, April 
23 transcript, pp. 22, 23. ) 17 The test tube m ethod, fr om pre-ferti liza-
, ,II 
tion through fertilization to implantation in the uterus, m eticu lously j 
calculates the origin of a new, actual, "individual" hum an being. The 
fact th at this fertilization takes place in a glass dish rather than in a . 
Fallop ian tube doesn 't change the essential human nature which is 
produced, any more than the germination of a seed in a nursery, 
rather t han in a forest, makes it essentially less a t ree. The science of 
botany readily grasps the difference between what essentially consti-
tutes a species and its various accidental changes. "Nor are plants 
static in form - they change as they grow. A plant is different not 
only from season to season, but from seed and seed lings to frui t ing, 
and from bud to blossoming. In fact, a plant really has four dim en-
sions: t he three which we see when looking at it, and a fourth 
one - time. The complete plant is a manifestation of a seri es of stages 
of growth. An acorn is as much an oak as is the maj estic forest t ree, 
and the leafless tree in winter is, botanically speaking, ju st the same as I 
the t ree in full leaf or in splendid autumn color - a ll are on ly t ime 
variants of the same species." 18 • 
Another way, perhaps superfluous, of giving clari ty to t he above 
confusion of the notion of life in general and in the individual is • 
contained in philosophy's concept of the "individual." " The individ-
ual or the individual thing is the concrete bearer of a n essence in its 
non-communicable particularity, as this pine t ree or thi s man Peter. 
The individual stands in contrast to the universal or t he essence which 
abstracts from every definite bearer and as su ch ca n be communicated 
to different subjects or carriers. Only the individual rea lly exists out-
side of the mind, while the universal as such ex ists only in conceptual 
thinking. ' Individual' is a Latin word which means literally: the 
undivided." 19 Hence, the " individual" is radically different from 
either the universal abstraction or even the m eani ng of life in general. 
Since individuality is said of an actual singu lar living human being 
established in its concrete reality, the question has often arisen as to 
how this can happen at the moment of fertilization, sin ce at a later 
time the cells on occasion split, and twin births result. " One witness 
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testified that cases in which twins arise from a single embryo suggest 
that the individual has not yet been ' stably constituted' until the point 
when twinning occurs" (testimony of Dr. Clifford Grobstein, Hearings 
on S158, May 20 transcript, p. 19). "But even in such ex ceptional 
cases of 'homozygous' twins, there is a being in existence from 
conception who is alive and human. That we can describe the forma-
tion of twins merely emphasizes that even at the earliest stages after 
conception we can have scientific knowledge of t he existence of 
distinct, individual human beings. " 20 
We wonder if the biological process in twinning isn ' t simply another 
example of how nature reproduces from other individuals without 
destroying that person's or persons' individuality. Simply because 
modern embryology hasn't discovered the how of the reality doesn't 
mean that there isn't an answer to the fact. It is quite evident that 
man and woman accomplish the production of an individual without 
destroying their own individuality. This is accomplished in the gener-
ative act: living materials are separated from the individual parents 
without destroying their individuality. Human reproduction is even 
accomplished without the generative act, by means of uniting the 
materials in a glass dish - test tube babies. There are even those who 
think the duplication of individuals with identical characteristics 
might be possible by way of cloning. In all su ch endeavors, whenever 
the matter for a human body is accessible, a new individua l becomes 
capable of existence. This was originally d enied in theory by some 
during the first attempts at test tube baby production. It was argued 
that only God could create; which, of course, is philosophically (and 
theologically) correct. 21 But Thomistic philosophy demonstrates that 
it is the human soul which God immediately creates, and this soul 
informs the matter which was derived from pre-existing m atter. Now, 
if unaided nature in the early embryonic stages so arranges the matter 
to provide another joined or disjoined individual t 9 the previously 
existing individual (twinning), how does this negate the individuality 
of a previously existing human being? The one remains. The second 
begins to live, having had its material existence potentially in the 
former as in a parent cell. If God infuses a human soul into the first 
isolated matter, why not in the second and newly isolated matter? 
4) "Person": individual of human species. 
Philosophically, individuals do not exist only in the human species 
but in every other material species in nature. However, among all the 
other species besides man , no individual is called a " person." Individ-
ual trees, dogs, rocks, etc., are not referred to as "persons" or the 
group as " people. " The term " person," even according to common 
knowledge is reserved for an "individual of a rational nature." It is 
also quite evident that the individual m ember possessing the rational 
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nature must not always be acting rationally for one to be a person. If 
this were true, then immature children, sleeping adults, anesthetized 
patients, etc., would all cease to be persons; it suffices for an individ-
ual to belong by nature to the human species. Such a state occurs at 
the moment of fertilization: the individual zygote is, in essence, a 
living being of a human nature. A child has been conceived. 
These various notions which philosophy employs in its definition of 
the "person" repeatedly surfaced and were also confirmed in the sub-
committee's report. "We find that the fourteenth amendment 
embodies the sanctity of human life and that today the government 
must affirm this ethic by recognizing the 'personhood' of all human 
beings. Earlier we found, based upon scientific examination, that the 
life of each human being begins at conception." 22 Briefly, person-
hood begins with each human life at conception. 
While discussing the "legal effect of S158," the subcommittee 
repeated its position on "personhood." "Now the findings of S158 
would appear to bring the question of personhood of unborn children 
within the holdings of Levy v. Louisiana, in which the Court stated 
that individuals who are 'humans, live, and have their being' cannot be 
'nonpersons' " (391 U.S. 68, 70 [1968] ).23 
Whenever the witnesses for the minority view addressed the ques-
tion of the "person" or "personhood," they did it also under the legal 
or scientific basis. 
From the legal standpoint, the testimony centered around what the 
Supreme Court already had judged in Roe v. Wade or proposed the 
question as to which legal authority belonged the jurisdiction to deter-
mine the meaning and extent of personhood. 24 
From the scientific standpoint, whether human life was considered 
to have begun at conception or not, it was generally conceded not to 
be within the realm of the physical sciences to determine "person-
hood."25 
A certain amount of exactness and integrity is conveyed in the 
latter approach. Generally, those involved in the physical sciences, 
specifically in embryology, are aware that the only certitude they have 
depends upon the evidence which their science presents either immed-
iately to the senses or mediately by way of technological instruments. 
Once anyone leaves this area of concreteness, other sciences must be 
enlisted - sciences valid in themselves and capable of organizing the 
related scientific facts. 
The subcommittee had more than sufficient scientific facts and 
testimony about the beginning of individual human life to make its 
own philosophizing relatively easy. The conclusions which 
immediately presented themselves to the subcommittee agreed with 
the major teachings in the "philosophy of man" on the beginning of 
individual human life. This individual is a person who is essentially the 
same from fertilization throughout all its stages of life. 
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